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JUMPING THE DISTINCTIVENESS HURDLE:
REGISTRABILITY OF TRADEMARKS WITH HIGH

TECHNOLOGY WORD COMPOSITIONS

I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are about to expand your small flower boutique
into the vast realm of the Internet. You register the domain name
"petals.com" for your business and start to use the term as your trademark
by selling flowers via the World Wide Web. Shortly after your e-business
starts, you attempt to register the name E-PETALS with the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (U.S.P.T.O.) for your on-line flower selling
and shipping services, but the U.S.P.T.O. denies your application. The
trademark examiner at the U.S.P.T.O. renders the mark descriptive of your
services, reasoning that "e-" commonly means "electronic" and "petals"
describes flowers. Therefore, the U.S.P.T.O. claims that E-PETALS fails
to identify your flowers in the mind of the consuming public.
Since the Internet became mainstream, trademark applications have
flooded the U.S.P.T.O. with marks comprising of high technology terms,
such as ".com," "e-,'.. i-," and "virtual.''' The U.S.P.T.O. has raised the
standard for registrability of these marks as the U.S.P.T.O., courts, and
general public have gained more knowledge about the Internet and its

1 See U.S.P.T.O., Examination Guide No. 2-99: Marks Composed, In Whole or In
Part,
of
Domain
Names,
September
29,
1999,
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/notices/guide299.htm
(recognizing
U.S.P.T.O.'s
reception of trademark applications with marks composed of domain names); In re
Styleclick.com, Inc., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1445, 1448 (T.T.A.B. 2000) (revealing pervasiveness
of Internet and its effects on new terminology). "Dot.com" is the top-level domain (TLD)
portion of a domain name, which is the Internet address. See U.S.P.T.O., Examination
Guide No. 2-99: Marks Composed, In Whole or In Part, of Domain Names, September 29,
1999, available at http:l/www.uspto.govlweblofficesltaclnoticeslguide299.htm. The "e-"
prefix means "electronic." See In re Styleclick.com, Inc., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1445, 1448
(T.T.A.B. 2000). The "i-" prefix may mean "information" or "Internet." See In re Int'l
Data Group, Inc., No. 74/618,652, 1998 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 325, at *5 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 14,
1998) (determining that IWAY means "information superhighway"); In re Zanova, Inc.,
Nos. 75/519,495 and 75/571,710, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 340, at *7, *14 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 30,
2001) (stating -'r stands for Internet in ITOOL). "Virtual" means "that someone at a
computer is able to encounter certain things in a non-physical or 'virtual' manner." In re
Styleclick.com, Inc., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1523, 1526 (T.T.A.B. 2001).
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terminology. 2 Yet the law still is very much unsettled despite recent
guidelines for ".com" cases and case precedent regarding the registrability
of marks with high technology word compositions.3 Presently, the
U.S.P.T.O. examines ".com" composition marks for registrability by
removing the ".com" portion and examining the remaining portion for
distinctiveness.4 For example, examiners determine that marks composed
of a descriptive word with ".com" are descriptive and, therefore,
unregistrable without proof of acquired distinctiveness.5 Unlike ".com"
cases, no guidelines exist for determining the registrability of "e-" prefix,
6
"i-" prefix, and "virtual" composition marks other than scant case law.
This note begins with a background in trademark law explaining,
factors for determining a trademark's registrability.
Next, Part III
examines trends by the U.S.P.T.O. in determining the registrability of
marks with "e-" prefix, "i-" prefix, and "virtual" compositions. In an
attempt to propose a rule for marks with these compositions, this section
also discusses the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's (T.T.A.B.)
reasoning for denying such marks registration. The conclusion examines
the potential consequences of a descriptiveness refusal and the importance
of creating examination guidelines for these marks.

See In re Styleclick.com, Inc., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1445, 1447-48 (T.T.A.B. 2000). At
the early stages of the Internet, the U.S.P.T.O. granted registrations to marks that would be
deemed descriptive or generic today because U.S.P.T.O. examiners and Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (T.T.A.B.) judges were unfamiliar with Internet terminology, and the law
was uncharted. See id.
3 Compare U.S.
Trademark Electronic Search System, available at
http://tess.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=tess&state=4tqgff. 1.1 (on-line search database of
federally filed trademarks), and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Examination Guide No.
2-99: Marks Composed, In Whole or In Part, of Domain Names, September 29, 1999,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/notices/guide299.htm
(providing
guidelines for ".com" marks), with In re Styleclick.com, Inc., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1445
(T.T.A.B. 2000) (holding E FASHION merely descriptive of computer software for
shopping and electronic shopping services), and In re Regal Disc. Sec., Inc., No.
75/329,304, 2000 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 756 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 14, 2000) (holding E-OPTION
suggestive of stock brokerage services).
4 See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Examination Guide No. 2-99: Marks
Composed, In Whole or In Part, of Domain Names, September 29, 1999, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/notices/guide299.htm
(proclaiming
merely
descriptive words combined with top-level domains merely descriptive).
See id.; discussion infra Part II C (explaining importance of acquired
distinctiveness for descriptive marks). Acquired distinctiveness is equivalent to "consumer
recognition and association." Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 119 F.
Supp.2d 1083, 1091 (C.D.Ca. 2000).
6 See discussion infra Part III.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. Trademarkpurpose and protection

Trademark law seeks to ensure that the public identifies goods and
services with their sources. 7 A main purpose of trademark law is to
prevent consumer confusion with other sources and, in particular, to
protect consumers from misidentifying "palmed off' goods or services as
the originals.8 The Lanham Act reveals that its intent is to prevent unfair
competition, fraud, and deception, among others, in commerce. 9
State law protected trademarks before federal trademark legislation
existed.1 °
Prior to federal trademark legislation, in order for an
infringement claim to be successful, the registrant had to show that the
infringer had knowledge of the registered mark and used the infringing
mark in the same commercial area as the registrant." In 1905, Congress
enacted one of the first trademark acts.' 2 Then in 1946, Congress enacted
the Lanham Act, which presently governs trademark law.' 3 Today, federal4
and state statutes-- as well as the common law-- protect trademarks.1
However, federal law supercedes state law when a conflict between the
two arises. 15
Federal trademark registration provides the registrant with
distinguished benefits. 16 For instance, a federal registrant is presumed to
7 Breakers of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Int'l Beach Hotel Dev., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 1576,
1581 (S.D.Fla. 1993) (stating policies supporting trademark law). The Lanham Act, the
statute governing trademark law, states that a trademark can be

any word, name, symbol, or device . . . (1) used by a person, or (2) which a
person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the
principal register established by this Act, to identify and distinguish his or her
goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and
to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.
Lanham Act §45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
8 See Breakers, 824 F. Supp. at 1581; Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc.,
826 F.2d 837, 845 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining when likelihood of confusion occurs).
9 Lanham Act §45, 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2000).
10 See Dawn Donut Co., Inc. v. Hart's Food Stores, 267 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1959)
(explaining trademark protection under state law prior to Lanham Act).
I Id. at 362.
12 United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand, America New York,
Inc., 128
F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1997).
13

See id.

14 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§
h

22:1, 22-2 (4" ed. 2001).
15 Id. at § 22:2, 22-6.

16 ROBERT P. MERGES, ET AL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE

640 (Richard A. Epstein ed., Aspen Law & Business 2000).
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own the mark identifying the goods or services.1 7 Specific potential
benefits include national constructive use and notice, incontestable status
after five years, and the ability to bring a federal claim. 18
Among the requirements for federal trademark registration, an
applicant must actually use the mark or have an intent to use the mark in
commerce.' 9 Section One of the Lanham Act sets forth the requirements of
mark owners in securing federal registration of marks "used in commerce"
or when the owner has a "bona fide intention . . . to use a trademark in
commerce." 20 The Act defines "commerce" as "all commerce which may
lawfully be regulated by Congress." ' 2' Precedent holds that commerce for
trademark purposes extends to transactions that "substantially affect",
interstate or foreign commerce.2 2
B.

The "sliding scale" of trademark distinctiveness

A trademark's scope of protection and overall registrabilty rests on
its level of distinctiveness.
The more distinctive the mark, the higher
level of protection it will receive. 24 The U.S.P.T.O. only grants registration
to distinctive marks or descriptive marks that have acquired
distinctiveness.2 5 The level of a mark's distinctiveness classifies it as:
generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful.26 This classification
system, which categorizes the distinctiveness of marks, is commonly
referred to as a "sliding scale." Generic marks, at the bottom of the sliding
scale, are afforded no protection and cannot be registered because they fail
17 MICHAEL L. RUSTAD & CYRUS

DAFrARY,

E-BUSINESS

LEGAL HANDBOOK §

4.03[F][1] (Aspen Law & Business 2001).

18 ROBERT P. MERGES, ET AL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL

AGE 640 (Richard A. Epstein ed., Aspen Law & Business 2000).
19 See Lanham Act §1, 15 U.S.C. §1051 (2000).
20 See id.
21
22

See Lanham Act §45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
See Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Williams Rest. Corp., 929 F.2d 662, 665 (Fed.

Cir. 1991) (quoting In re Silenus Wines, Inc., 557 F.2d 806, 811-12 (C.C.P.A. 1977)); see
also Buti v. Perosa, 139 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing influence of Commerce
Clause on trademark law).
23 See Breakers of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Int'l Beach Hotel Dev., Inc., 824 F. Supp.
1576, 1582 (S.D.Fa. 1993) (examining levels of trademark distinctiveness and importance
of distinctiveness).
24 See id.; TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE, 2d ed., Revision 1.1,
1209.01, availableat http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/tmep/. This notion is consistent
with the meaning of "trademark" under the Lanham Act, which states that a trademark is
used "to identify and distinguish his or her goods ... from those manufactured or sold by
others..." Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2000) (emphasis added).
25 See TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE, 2d ed., Revision 1.1, 1212,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/tmep/; Lanham Act §2(f), 15 U.S.C. §
1052(0 (2000).
26 Breakers, 824 F. Supp. at 1582.
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to identify the applicant's own goods or services.27 By their nature,
generic marks only provide information about the type of goods or services
but fail to serve as identifiers of the source of the goods or services.28
Further, if generic marks were offered protection, they would preclude
others from using the generic term to describe a similar product or
service. 29 Next on the sliding scale are descriptive marks, which the
U.S.P.T.O. may register provided the marks have achieved acquired
distinctiveness. 30 Finally, suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks have
the highest level of protection and may be registered without proof of
acquired distinctiveness. 3' "Suggestive marks subtly connote something
about the service or product" with the use of the consumer's imagination.3 2
Arbitrary marks, which offer even stronger protection, are marks that "bear
no relationship to the product or service" of the mark.33 Fanciful marks
offer the most protection.34 Fanciful marks are original and have no
association with the product or service bearing the mark. 35

27

Id.

Id.: see also A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 308 (3d Cir. 1986)
(holding CHOCOLATE FUDGE, as applied to soda, generic and not protectable).
29 A.J. Canfield, 808 F.2d at 297. "Even complete 'success ... in securing public
identification... cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call
an article by its name."' Id. (quoting Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537
F.2d 4, 9 (2d. Cir. 1976)).
30 See Breakers, 824 F. Supp. at 1582-83; Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo
&
Co., Inc., 119 F. Supp.2d 1083, 1091 (C.D.Ca. 2000) (describing descriptiveness and
acquired distinctiveness). A term is merely descriptive
28

if it immediately describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic or feature thereof
or if it directly conveys information regarding the nature, function, purpose or use
of the goods and/or services... Moreover, whether a term is merely descriptive is
determined not in the abstract, but in relation to the goods and/or services .... the
context in which it is being used .... and the possible significance that the term
would have to the average purchaser...
In re Styleclick.com, Inc. 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1445, 1447 (T.T.A.B. 2001).
31 Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V., 119 F. Supp.2d at 1091. "Marks that are arbitrary,
fanciful, or suggestive are regarded as immediately capable of identifying particular goods
and services . . . and are, in effect, 'irrebuttably presumed to have achieved customer
recognition and association immediately upon adoption and use."' Id. (citing 4 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 15:1 at 15-5).
32 Breakers, 824 F. Supp. at 1583 (holding THE BREAKERS for oceanfront hotel as
suggestive mark).
33 Id. (providing APPLE for computers and IVORY for soap as examples of arbitrary
marks).
34Id.
35 Id. (providing XEROX and KODAK as examples of fanciful marks).
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C. Acquired distinctiveness
Acquired distinctiveness, also known as "secondary meaning," is
consumers' recognition of a trademark and identification of it with its
source. 36 A user with a non-registered descriptive mark is entitled to
protection only in the areas in which the mark has gained secondary
meaning.37 This rule is consistent with the common law principle of usethat "the senior user of a mark cannot38 monopolize markets that neither his
trade nor his reputation has reached.,
Furthermore, secondary meaning indicates the extent to which nonregistered descriptive marks have protection and also is a requirement fpr
federal registration of descriptive marks.39 Section Two of the Lanham
Act denies registration to descriptive or misdescriptive marks,
geographically descriptive marks, and surnames used as marks, unless the
mark "has become distinctive as used on or in connection with the
applicant's goods in commerce.' ' 4 The Lanham Act does not state the
requirements for secondary meaning and instead leaves interpretation to
the courts and the U.S.P.T.O. 4 1 Specific evidence that the U.S.P.T.O. has
considered in determining the existence of secondary meaning include:
long use of the mark; advertising expenditures; affidavits or declarations
asserting recognition of a mark as a source indicator; and surveys, market
research, and consumer reaction studies.42
III. TRENDS IN THE REGISTRABILITY OF "E-" PREFIX, "I-"
PREFIX, AND "VIRTUAL" COMPOSITION MARKS
A.

"E-" prefix marks

To date, the T.T.A.B. has decided a hand-full of appeals from
applicants who were refused registration of their "e-" prefix marks by
36

See Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V., 119 F. Supp.2d at 1091 (describing meaning and

importance of secondary meaning); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc. 826 F.2d
837, 843 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting secondary meaning depends on public's association of
trademark with source). "The phrase 'has become distinctive' in the Lanham Act is
synonymous with the term 'secondary meaning."' J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 15:60, 15-93 (4 th ed. 2001).
37 Adray v. Adray-Mart, Inc., 76 F.3d 984, 987-88 (9th Cir. 1996).
38 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, §26:2, 26-6 (4th ed. 2001).
39 See generallyAdray, 76 F.3d at 987-88; Lanham Act §2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000).
40 See Lanham Act §2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2000).
41 See J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 15:66, 15-94.3 ( 4 "hed. 2001).
42 See TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE, 2d ed., Revision 1.1,
1212.06, availableat http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/tmep/.
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trademark examiners on the basis of lack of distinctiveness.4 3 The oldest
case reported was decided October 19, 2000.44 The Board held such a
mark to be suggestive only once.45 By only considering the T.T.A.B.
appeals, one could be misled in thinking that the U.S.P.T.O. deems most
"e-" prefix marks to be merely descriptive. 46 A federal registration search,
however, indicates that the U.S.P.T.O. has registered many "e-" prefix
composition marks prior to the year 2000.4 7 A closer examination of the
U.S.P.T.O.'s trends in registering "e-" prefix marks suggests that until
1999, the U.S.P.T.O. granted registrations to virtually all applicants with

43 See In re U.S. Tsubaki, Inc. No. 75/684,389, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 737 (T.T.A.B.

Sept. 28, 2001) (holding E-CHAIN merely descriptive of electronic catalog and software
regarding industrial roller chain); In re Cairo, No. 75/596,169, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 675
(T.T.A.B. Sept. 17, 2001) (holding ECERTIFIED merely descriptive of certification of
delivery of e-mail messages); In re E* Prescription, Inc., No. 75/589,909, 2001 T.T.A.B.
LEXIS 596 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 9, 2001) (holding EPHYSICIAN descriptive of computer
hardware and software for delivery of drug prescriptions); In re U.S. Tsubaki, Inc., No.
75/684,041, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 592 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 9, 2001) (holding E-SPROCKET
merely descriptive of electronic catalog regarding industrial chain drive and idler
sprockets); In re Consumer Ins. Group, No.75/772,303, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 474
(T.T.A.B. June 19, 2001) (holding ETERM merely descriptive of insurance brokerage
services); In re Brian S. Gladden, No. 75/711,666, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 435 (T.T.A.B.
June 6, 2001) (holding EOUTDOORS merely descriptive of on-line services related to
outdoor activities); In re Brian S. Gladden, No. 75/711,655, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 372
(T.T.A.B. May 11, 2001) (holding EOUTDOORS merely descriptive of on-line services
related to outdoor activities); In re Mark S. Cooperman, No. 75/652,852, 2001 T.T.A.B.
LEXIS 128 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 2001) (holding EMAILER ID merely descriptive of e-mail
software and presentation software); In re eCash Tech., Inc., No. 74/605,417, 2000
T.T.A.B. LEXIS 723 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 29 2000) (holding E-CASH merely descriptive of
computers and related goods for the transfer of data); In re Styleclick.com, Inc., 57
U.S.P.Q.2d 1445 (T.T.A.B. 2000) (holding E FASHION merely descriptive of computer
software for shopping and electronic shopping services); In re Regal Disc. Sec., Inc., No.
75/329,304, 2000 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 756 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 14, 2000) (holding E-OPTION
suggestive of stock brokerage services); In re Seifert, No. 75/273,635, 2000 T.T.A.B.
LEXIS 793 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 19, 2000) (holding E-CATALOG merely descriptive of
computer software for use in creating a catalog). See also Continental Airlines, Inc. v.
United Air Lines, Inc., No. 98,459, 1999 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 717 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 29, 1999)
(holding E-TICKET generic of electronic ticketing services).
See generally
http:l/www.uspto.gov/webloffices/com/sol/foia/ttab/decsum/decsum.htm
(providing
summaries of T.T.A.B. decisions from 1996 to 2002). However, only one of the cases, In
re Styleclick.com, Inc., is citable as precedent of the T.T.A.B.
44 See supra note 43; In re Seifert, No. 75/273,635, 2000 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 793
(T.T.A.B. Oct. 19, 2000).
45 See supra note 43 (listing In re Regal Disc. Sec., Inc., which held E-OPTION
suggestive of stock brokerage services).
46 See generally supra note 43.
47 See
U.S.
Trademark
Electronic
Search
System,
available at
http://tess.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=tess&state=4tqgff.1.1 (on-line search database of
federally filed trademarks); In re Styleclick.com, Inc., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1447-48. Most of
these marks were registered between 1997-1998. See id.
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"e-" prefix marks. 48 Aside from reasoning that the U.S.P.T.O. has
inconsistent practices regarding the examination of these marks and
reasoning that each application is decided on its own facts, a strong
explanation for the inconsistency is the growth and effects of the Internet.4 9
A good example of the T.T.A.B.'s analysis is in In re
Styleclick.com, Inc. ("Styleclick.com r').'0 In that case, the applicant
sought to register the mark E FASHION for "computer software for
consumer use in shopping," "computer software for providing fashion...
advice," and "electronic retailing services . . .,51 The applicant appealed
the trademark examiner's refusal arguing that the mark was suggestive. 52
Disclosing that "e-" means "electronic," the applicant argued -that
"electronic fashion" requires "thought and deliberation . . . to glean its
significance in relation to the goods and services. '53 The T.T.A.B.,
however, affirmed the trademark examiner's decision. 4
The
Styleclick.com I court did not provide a bright-line rule for determining the
registrability of "e-" prefix marks, but it did provide some guidance for
future applications. 55 The court found that the "e-" prefix generally has the
meaning of "electronic" in terms of computers and the Internet.56
Additionally, the court pronounced that a "non-source identifying prefix,"
when used in conjunction with another descriptive term, renders the whole
48

Compare supra note 43, with U.S. Trademark Electronic Search System, available

at http://tess.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=tess&state=4tqgff.1.1 (on-line search database of
federally filed trademarks). See In re Styleclick.com, Inc., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1448
(discussing registration of "e-" prefix marks).
49 See In re Styleclick.com, Inc., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1448. As the T.T.A.B. has stated,
While, by most standards, one to three years in the past would be viewed as
'recent,' a year or two is an eternity in 'Internet time,' given the rapid
advancement of the Internet into every facet of daily life ... Only 'recently,' the
Internet meaning of the 'e-' prefix may have been known only by those few who
were then accessing the Internet. We have no doubt that in the year 2000, the
meaning of the 'e-' prefix is commonly recognized and understood by virtually
everyone as a designation for the Internet.
Id. at 1448.
50 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1445 (T.T.A.B. 2000).

Since Styleclick.com, Inc. appealed the

refusals of two different marks and both cases have the same
them as "Styleclick.com 1' and "Styleclick.com H." See In
U.S.P.Q.2d 1445 (T.T.A.B. 2000) (deciding registrability
Styleclick.com, Inc., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1523 (T.T.A.B. 2001)
VIRTUAL FASHION).
51 In re Styleclick.com, Inc., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1446.
52

53
54
55
56

id.
id.
Id. at 1448.
Id.

name, this note will refer to
re Styleclick.com, Inc., 57
of E FASHION); In re
(deciding registrability of

In re Styleclick.com, Inc., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1445, 1448 (T.T.A.B. 2000).
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mark merely descriptive.57 The T.T.A.B.'s policy reason for holding such
marks merely descriptive is that terms such as "e-" must remain available
for other Internet users.5 8
B. "I-" prefix marks

As with "e-" prefix marks, the U.S.P.T.O. has been inconsistent in
registering marks with the "i-" prefix composition. 59 The U.S.P.T.O. has
registered marks with "i-" prefixes, but in all T.T.A.B. cases regarding
registrability of marks with an "i-" prefix, the court has affirmed the
refusal. 60 The absence of guidelines within the U.S.P.T.O. as to how to
treat these marks makes the examination of them difficult.
The "i-" prefix commonly stands for either "Internet" or
"information" in the high technology field.6' In In re Zanova, the T.T.A.B.
affirmed the refusal to register ITOOL for computer services and software
for use in creating web pages.62 After reviewing the evidence that
"Internet tools" is a commonly used term to refer to computer programs
relating to the Internet, the court determined that ITOOL does not make a

5' Id. The Styleclick.com I court's proposed examination of "e-" prefix marks is
similar to the examination of marks composed of ".com" and other TLD marks, which are
analyzed by removing the ".com" portion and determining the distinctiveness of the
remaining portion of the mark. Compare supra note 4 with In re Styleclick.com, Inc., 57
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1448. The T.T.A.B. has determined that the combination of two generic or
descriptive terms does not necessarily result in an arbitrary or suggestive whole. See In re
U.S. Tsubaki, Inc., No. 75/684,041, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 592, at *6-7 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 9,
2001). This is consistent with the U.S.P.T.O.'s guidelines on reviewing marks composed in
whole or in part of a TLD that the TLD "does not add source identifying significance to the
composite mark." See supra note 4.
58 In re Styleclick.com, Inc., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1448.
59 See infra note 60.
60 See In re Zanova, Inc. No. 75/519,495 and 75/571,710, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 340
(T.T.A.B. Apr 30, 2001) (holding ITOOL merely descriptive of computer services and
software for web site design); In re IntraGroup, Inc., No. 75/477,608, 2001 T.T.A.B.
LEXIS 260 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2001) (holding ITJOBS merely descriptive and generic of
on-line resumes and job placement information); In re Int'l Data Group, Inc., No.
74/618,652, 1998 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 325 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 14, 1998) (holding IWAY merely
descriptive of newsletters, journals, newspapers, and books regarding online
communication
topics).
See
generally
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/comsol/foialttab/decsum/decsum.htm
(providing
summaries of T.T.A.B. decisions from 1996 to 2002). Only In re Zanova, Inc. is citable as
precedent of the T.T.A.B.
61 See generally In re Int'l Data Group, Inc., No. 74/618,652, 1998 T.T.A.B. LEXIS
325, at *5 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 14, 1998) (determining "IT" means "information technology");
In re Zanova, Inc., Nos. 75/519,495 and 75/571,710, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 340 (T.T.A.B.
Apr. 30, 2001) (determining r' stands for "Internet" in ITOOL).
62 In re Zanova, Inc., Nos. 75/519,495 and 75/571,710, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 340, at
*1, *20 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 30, 2001).
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"registrable composite. '63 Similarly, the court in In re IntraGroup, Inc.
found that ITJOBS for a service providing online resumes and job
placement information was generic and merely descriptive because "IT"
means "information technology" and "information technology jobs" was
the service that the mark sought to identify. 64 In determining the
registrability of the marks in In re Zanova and In re IntraGroup,Inc., the
courts first examined the compositions of the marks for their meaning. 65
Then the courts made a final determination based on the mark as a whole
when considering the goods or services that the marks identified. 6
C.

"Virtual" type marks

As with "e-" prefix and "i-" prefix marks, the U.S.P.T.O. has treated
marks with "virtual" compositions inconsistently.67
Although the
registrability of third party marks cannot determine the registrability of a
different mark for different goods and/or services, third party registrations
provide insight as to the U.S.P.T.O.'s trends in granting registration to
similar marks.68 The U.S.P.T.O. has granted registration to "virtual" type
marks in the past but more recently has denied them registration. 69
63

See In re Zanova, Inc., Nos. 75/519,495 and 75/571,710, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS

340, at *14-16 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 30, 2001).
64 In re IntraGroup, Inc., No. 75/477,608, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 260, at *5,*17
(T.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2001).
65 In re Zanova, Inc., Nos. 75/519,495 and 75/571,710, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 340, at
*14 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 30, 2001); In re IntraGroup, Inc., No. 75/477,608, 2001 T.T.A.B.
LEXIS 260, at *5 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2001).
66 In re Zanova, Inc., Nos. 75/519,495 and 75/571,710, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 340, at
*17 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 30, 2001); In re IntraGroup, Inc., No. 75/477,608, 2001 T.T.A.B.
LEXIS 260, at *13 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2001).
67 See In re Styleclick.com, Inc., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1523, 1526-27 (T.T.A.B. 2001)
(providing examples of where U.S.P.T.O. has not treated "virtual" type marks, like
applicant's, consistently).
68 See id. at 1526.
69 See generally In re Prize Central Networks, Inc., No. 75/509,370, 2001 T.T.A.B.
LEXIS 745 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 3, 2001) (holding VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS for on-line computer
games distinctive and registrable); In re Concurrent Tech. Corp., No. 75/538,498, 2001
T.T.A.B. LEXIS 332 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 26, 2001) (holding VIRTUALCAST merely
descriptive of "computer software for simulating metal forming processes"); In re
SpecComm Int'l, Inc., No. 75/300,898, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 216 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 28, 2001)
(holding VIRTUAL FIRE & RESCUE EXPO merely descriptive of online workshops in
fire and rescue field); In re Styleclick.com, Inc., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1523 (T.T.A.B. 2001)
(holding VIRTUAL FASHION merely descriptive of computer software in relation to
shopping, fashion, and beauty); In re EIS Int'l, Inc. No. 75/510, 2000 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 872
(T.T.A.B. Dec. 12, 2000) (holding VIRTUAL CENTER FORECASTER not merely
descriptive of software and database for running global forecasts); In re Am.Online, No.
75/280,610, 1999 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 611 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 27, 1999) (holding VIRTUAL KEY
not merely descriptive of computer services). Of all these cases, only In re Styleclick.com,
Inc. ("Styleclick com I") is citable as precedent of the T.T.A.B. The Styleclicklcom H court
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The only citable T.T.A.B. decision regarding "virtual" marks, In re
Styleclick.com, Inc.70 ("Sytleclick.com I"), points to this inconsistency
within the U.S.P.T.O.7" In this case, the T.T.A.B. affirmed the examiner's
refusal of the mark VIRTUAL FASHION for computer software and
retailing services in regard to fashion, shopping, and beauty.72 The court
recognized that the U.S.P.T.O. has been inconsistent in determining the
registrability of marks with "virtual" compositions.73 Although the court
did not provide a bright-line rule for examining such a trademark, the court
did provide some guidance.74 First, the court examined the meaning of the
two words in the mark individually.75 Then the court analyzed them as a
whole in relation to the goods and services.7 6 Since both words were
merely descriptive of the goods and services, the mark was descriptive as a
whole.7 7 The court denied registration recognizing the need "to protect the
competitive needs of others, that is, 'descriptive words must be left free for
public use."' 7 8

D. Conclusion: The importance of articulatingproperexamination
proceduresfor "e-" prefix, "i-" prefix, and "virtual" composition marks
In examining a mark with an "e-" prefix, "i-" prefix, or "virtual"
composition, it is important to recognize that the use of the mark in relation
to the goods or services it identifies is what determines the mark's
distinctiveness. 79 For example, consider the mark VIRTUAL BLACK for
reasoned that the inconsistency results from the growth of the Internet.
In re
Styleclick.com, Inc. 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1523, 1527 (T.T.A.B. 2001). As the Styleclick.com II
court stated,
Only "recently," the computer or Internet meaning of "virtual" may have been
known only by those few who were then using computers or accessing the
Internet. We have no doubt that in the year 2001, the meaning of the term
"virtual" is commonly recognized and understood by most people as meaning
something that is merely conceptual rather than something that has physical
reality, especially in connection with things encountered via computers and the
Internet.
Id.
58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1523 (T.T.A.B. 2001).
See In re Styleclick.com, Inc., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1526-27.
72 Id. at 1524, 1528.
73 Id. at 1526-27.
14 See id. at 1527 (analyzing the registrability of VIRTUAL
FASHION).
75 In re Styleclick.com, Inc. 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1523, 1526 (T.T.A.B. 2001).
76 Id.
70

71

77 Id.
71 See id. at 1527 (citing In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 157 U.S.P.Q. 382,

383 (C.C.P.A. 1968)).
79 See In re IntraGroup, Inc., No. 75/477,608, 2001 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 260, at *13
(T.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2001). "[Dlescriptiveness of a mark is not considered in the abstract,
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watch repair services. If the services are not "virtual" within the meaning
of the Internet or any other meaning, and the word "black" has no
affiliation with the services, the mark may be distinctive. Alternatively, if
the mark immediately describes the goods and/or services, the mark is
merely descriptive, or possibly even generic, and cannot be granted
registration on the Principal Register.
Having a trademark examiner deem a mark merely descriptive may
have grave consequences. Often the financial effects of a descriptiveness
refusal may be significant. A company that already has advertised,
manufactured, and placed its goods in the marketplace could be greatly
affected by a refusal. Since the benefits of federal registration are so
desirable, a trademark refusal could prompt a company to pull all of its
products off the shelves and re-start the manufacturing and advertising
process with a new trademark. Alternatively, the company could appeal to
the T.T.A.B. and then appeal again to a federal court, but, of course,
litigation also is expensive. Overall, it is important for the applicant to
have a strong mark to better identify the goods and services and to prevent
the costly effects of a trademark registration denial.
To better inform trademark applicants and their attorneys of the
possible detrimental consequences of using a mark with a high technology
word composition, the U.S.P.T.O. should implement explicit regulations
regarding the examination of marks composed in part of high technology
termrs, such as "e- ....
.i-," and "virtual." Presently, only a few cases
regarding the registrability of marks with "e-" prefixes, "i-" prefixes, and
"virtual" compositions are citable as precedent of the T.T.A.B. Trademark
applicants with marks of such compositions who file for registration
without the assistance of attorneys most likely have little way of knowing
that the mark's prefix does not make an otherwise descriptive mark
distinctive. The Internet age arrived, and the U.S.P.T.O. should implement
guidelines regarding the examination of trademarks with compositions that
reflect society's developments.
Elizabeth A. Shaw

but in relation to the particular goods or services for which registration is sought." Id.

